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GLANVILL ON THE COMMON LAW: LEX TERRAE AND
IUS REGNI
MAX RADIN t

Only English law has a Glanvill and, as has been said in the case of the
Year Books, only in English speaking countries, should we have had to wait
so long for an adequate edition.- The publication of Professor Woodbine's
Glanvill, 2 therefore, should mark a period in Glanvill-studies and stimulate
renewed interest in the early history of English law. It may confidently
be stated that now for the first time we have a definitive text and that no one
need hereafter concern himself with manuscripts or with any variant readings
that are not in Professor Woodbine's apparatus criticus.3
It is not necessary to discuss the position of Glanvill in the history of
our law. That we should have a book written by a first rate man at the
time when most of the institutions of later law were still in a formative
state but already recognizable, is a piece of quite undeserved good fortune.
Everything in Glanvill is historically important. It is regrettable in the
highest degree that he was not aware of that fact. If he had been, statements
based on his use of terms could be far more confidently made.4
But under all circumstances, although Glanvill was a man of affairs
and neither a philologist nor an historian, the significance of phrases in legal
documents and legal discussion was well enough known to him. We may
therefore profitably investigate whether the use of certain expressions permits some inferences about the concept of English law which was in the
mind of this first professed writer on English law.
t A.B., 1899, College of City of New York; LL.B., 19o2, New York University; Ph.D.,

i9o9, Columbia University; professor of law, University of California; author, HANDBOOK
OF RO MAN LAW (I927) ; contributor to legal periodicals.
'One cannot too frequently echo Maitland's reproach to English and American lawyers,
I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HIsT1oY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1911) xxxv, repeated and emphasized by BOLLAND, MANUAL OF YEAR BOOK STUDIES (1925) 34.
2 GLANVIL, DE LEGmus Er CONSU=rUDrNIBUs RrGNI ANGLIAE.

Edited by George E.
Woodbine. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932, ix, 3o6.
' The only previous important discussion of Glanvill's text is by Maitland himsetf, Glanyille Revised (1892) 6 HAiv. L. REV. I.
'The question of whether Glanvill himself wrote this treatise is not important for our
purposes.

Maitland (I POLLOCK & MAITLANDA op. cit. supra note I, at 164) suggested that

it might have been the work of Hubert Walter, Glanvill's kinsman, afterwards justiciar and
Archbishop of Canterbury, a suggestion a little more strongly made by T. F. T. PLUCKNET,
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (1929) 19, 179. The denial of Glanvill's authorship is quite independent of the ascription to Hubert, which rests on a reference in BRACION,
DE LEGIUS Er CONSuEruDINIBuS ANGLIAE f. i88b. Cf. I POLLOCK & MAITLAND, op. cit.
supra note I, at 164, n. 5.

It is presented by Maitland only as a suggestion.

Some doubt is

cast on it by the fact that in one of the manuscripts of Glanvill, Z, ascribed by WOODBIN,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 20, 220, to the thirteenth century, there is a reference to H. Walteri
(WOODBINE, op. Cit. supra note 2, at 92, n. 77). If Hubert had been known by Bracton to

be the author of the treatise-an assumption on which Maitland's conjecture depends-a
writer of nearly the same time would not have supposed that "Glanvill" was citing Hubert.
(26)
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The title of the book is Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibusregni
Anglia. The expression legibus regni et consuetudinibus occurs in the
prologue. And it is further apparent that the two words leges and consuetudines are in this prologue treated as a hendiadys. The term, leges Anglicance,
includes them both. But leges and consuetudines are none the less not
synonymous. Leges is the more general term and within it might be included
not merely consuetudines-althoughthese formed the main content of the
notion-but conceivably other determinations which in fact had the force
of law.
That Glanvill had, any juristic theory in a sense that would pass muster
among professors of jurisprudence might be a little difficult to establish,
but that he entertained no concepts about the nature and source of law is
hardly likely. He surely knew the Institutes of Justinian and not merely
some school-boy summary of them ' and it is rather unlikely that he was
wholly unaware of canonical and scholastic disputations on these and kindred subjects. Theory and practice were generally merged in a society in
which military, ecclesiastical, administrative and judicial functions were
frequently the task of one man, who had in addition to justify his assumptions of authority against the jealous scrutiny of rival claimants. And we
need merely glance at any political controversy of the time to see how every
practical dispute would be placed, as far as possible, on a basis as broad and
high as Infinity itself.
What phrases does Glanvill use besides leges et consuetudines when he
wishes to refer to something more than a particular provision or a local
custom? We find ius et consuetudo regni, ius regni, lex terrce. To examine
them, it may be of value to list all the relevant passages with an English
version. 6
Ius regni
i. Title. [Woodbine, p. 231 lustitice gubernacula tenente illustri
viro Ranulfo de Glanvilla iuris regni et antiquarum consuetudinum eo
teinpore peritissimo.
"While the helm of justice was held by the illustrious Ranulph de
Glanvill, who was at that time more conversant than any other man with
the law and the ancient customs of the realm."
2. Preface.
[W. p. 24] Leges autem et iura regni scripto universaliter concludi nostris temporibus quidem omnino impossibile est.
"However, as far as our times are concerned, it is quite impossible
for the various forms of law of the realm to be completely committed
to writing."
r I POL.toci & MAIThAND, op. cit. supra note I, at 165. Phrases in Glanvill that echo
the Institutes are not confined to the trite phrases mentioned there, ibid. n. I.
'The 'translation is in most cases a paraphrase. No attempt has been made to give an
archaic tone to the version.
sons for whom he wrote.

Archaic is exactly what Glanvill was not in the eyes of the per-
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3. Lib. vii, c. i [W. p. 99] Magna quidem iuris dubitatio et virorum iuris regni peritorum disceptatio super tali causa in curia domini
regis quandoque evenit vel evenire potest super hoc, scilicet quis isti de
iure succedere debeat et possit.
"Indeed sometimes a serious legal question and a controversy bebetween men conversant with the law of the realm arises in such a case,
or one may arise; on this point, to-wit, who ought or may lawfully
succeed him."
(The question refers to the succession of a deceased son, a grantee
of his father and seized in his surviving father's lifetime.)
4. Lib. vii, c. i [W. p. 99] . . . quia generaliterverum est secundum ius regni quod nemo eiusdem tenementi simul potest esse heres et
dominus.
"Because in general it is true according to the law of the realm that
no one can at the same time be heir and lord of the same tenement."
5. Lib. vii, I [W. p. 102] . . . tunc secundum ius regni Anglia
primogenitus filius patri succedit in totum.
" . . . then according to the law of the realm of England, the firstborn son succeeds his father in the whole estate."
6. Lib. vii, 15 [W. pp. iii and 112] . . . vel hereditatem de iure
regni petere potest.
"Nor may he claim the inheritance by the law of the realm."
(More fully given in No. 16 infra.)
7. Lib. vii, c. 16 [W. p. 112] Heredes quoque ipsius hac eadem.
de causa exheredantur secundum ius regni et ad dominum vel dominos
revertetur hereditas.
"Further his [sc. the usurer's] heirs for this same reason are disinherited according to the law of the realm and the inheritance will
return to the lord or lords."
8. Lib. vii, c. 17 [W. p. 114] Prcetereasi quis de felonia convictus
fuerit vel confessus in curia, eo per ius regni exheredato, terrasua domino suo remanet escceta.
"Besides if anyone has been convicted of felony or has confessed
guilt before the court, by the law of the realm he is disinherited and
his land is escheated to his lord."
Jus et consuetudo regni
9. Lib. ii, c. 3 [W. p. 59] Et quidem secundum ius et consuetudinem regni antiquam non'licet nisi filium suum legitimum.
"And indeed according to the law and the ancient custom of the
realm, it may be no one but his legitimate son."
(The reference is to a substitute champion.)
io. Lib. iii, c. 4 [W. p. 72] Et quidem ita fiet secundum ius et
consuetudinem regni, quia si alius terrain ipsam vel saisinam ipsius
terrce propter defaltain warrantisui amittit, warrantusinde ei tenebitur
ad competens escambium.
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"And indeed it will be so done in accordance with the law and
custom of the realm, because if some one else loses the land itself or the
seisin of the land because of a failure of warranty, the warrantor will
then be held to provide a suitable land in exchange."
i i. Lib. v, c. 5 [W. p. 86] . . . posset enim tunc a domino suo

secundunt ins et consuetudinem regni ad vilenagium revocari, quia
omnia catalla cuiuslibet nativi ita intellunguntur in potestate domini
sui .
"He might then in accordance with the law and custom of the
realm be reduced by his lord to villainage, because all the chattels of a
serf are in so far understood to be in the power of his lord."
12. Lib. vi, c. 10 [W. p. 92] Heres igitur summonitus si nec
venerit etc. .

.

. qualiter distringi debeat vel possit de iure et consue-

tudine regni quwri potest.
"If an heir does not come when summoned, it may be asked how
he ought or may be attached by the law and custom of the realm."
13. Lib. vii, 5 [W. p. 05o] Quicquid autem diversarun patriaruin
consuetudines super hoc teneant, secundum iura regni non tenetur quis
in testanzento suo alicui persone prcecipue nisi pro voluntate sua aliquid
relinquere; libera enim debet esse cuiusque ultima voluntas, secundum
has sicut et secundum alias leges.
"Whatever the customs of various communities may hold on this
point, no one according to the laws of the realm is required to leave
anything to any one person more than to another, except as he wishes;
for the will of any person should be free according to our laws, just
as in accordance with other systems of laws."
14. Lib. vii, 12 [W. p. 109] Quia sine dominorum dispositione
vel assensu nulla mulier heres terre maritaripotest, de iure vel consuetudine regni. Unde si quis filiarn vel filias tanturn habens heredern,
illarn vel illas in vita sua sine assensu dontini sui maritaverit, inde inste
secundum ins et consuetudinem regni perpetuo exheredatur.
"Because no woman who is heir to land can be married without
the direction or assent of their lords, by the law and custom of the realm.
Hence if anyone has only a daughter or daughters as heir and marries
her or them in his lifetime without the assent of his lord, then properly
according to the law and custom of the realm, he is forever testamentarily incapacitated."
15. Lib. vii, 12 [W. p. iio] Non enim videtur quod debeat ideo
dotem suam arnitterecum maritussuus inde nullum homagium waranto
suo de iure et consuetudine regni facere debeat.
"For it does not seem right that a woman should lose her dower
for the sole reason that her husband is not bound by his warranty
according to the law and custom of the realm to do homage [for the
dower-land]."
16. Lib. vii, c. 15 [W. pp. iii and 112] Et quidem licet secundum

canones et leges romanas talis filius sit legitimus heres, tamen secundum
ins regni et consuetudinem nullo viodo taniquam heres in hereditate
sustinetur, vel hereditatem de iure regni petere potest.
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"And as a matter of fact, although according to the canons and
the Roman Law such a son is the legitimate heir, yet according to the
law and custom of the realm he is in no way to be kept as heir in his
inheritance nor can he claim the inheritance by the law of the realm."
Leax terre
17. Lib. ii, c. 3 [W. p. 60] Finito autem duello pena sexaqinta
solidorum imminebit victo nomine recreantise [var. recreantis] et preterea legem terre amittet...
Si vero super hoc convictus et per duellhtn victus fuerit, tunc dominus suus loquelam suam amittet et ille victus omnem legem terre amittet,
scilicet, quod de cetero in curia numquam admittetur ut testis ad dirationationem.pro alio per duellum de cetero faciendam.
"After the battle is over, the loser who has cried craven is faced
with the penalty of sixty solidi and besides will lose his lex terre...
"But if he is attainted for this and is beaten in battle, then his lord
loses his plea and the one beaten in battle loses all the leax terre;to-wit,
he will never thereafter be admitted as a witness in court [nor] be
allowed to make proof by combat for another person."
18. Lib. ii, c. 19 [W. p. 69] Intsuper autem de cetero legem terre
amittentes perpetuam infamie notam inde merito incurrent. Qua
pwna ideo recte constituta est, ut quoslibet ab illicita prastationesacramenti in tali causa coerceat similitudo supplicii.
"Besides they [sc. the attainted assize] lose thereafter the leax terre
and justly receive a perpetual brand of infamy for their conduct. This
punishment is rightly established with this end in view that the improper
taking of an oath on the part of any person may in such a case be restrained by assimilating the punishment to that of perjurers generally."
19. Lib. v, c. 5 [W. p. 87] Quia si prius nativus ad libertatem
hoc modo productus contra extraneum aliquem ad dirationationem
faciendam producereturin curia, vel ad aliquamlegem terrae faciendam,
posset inde iuste amoveri.
"But if before this, a serf presented in this way, is presented in
court to make a proof against a stranger or to make some form of lex
terre, he may be lawfully removed."
20. Lib. vii, 17 [W. p. 114] Cum quis vero per legem terre fuerit
utlagatus et postmodum beneficio principis paci restitutus, non poterit
ea ratione hereditatem .
ficio . . . recuperare.

.

.

nisi ex misericordiaipsius domini et bene-

"When anyone has been outlawed by the lex terre and thereafter
by the favor of the sovereign, restored to the public peace, he will not
for that reason alone be able to recover his inheritance . . . except as

a personal act of mercy and favor of his lord."
21. Lib. x, c. 3 [W. p. 1341 Curn quis itaque aliquid tale crediderit,
si plus eo receperit, usuram facit, et si in tali crimine obierit, damnabitur
tamquam usurariusper legem terre, unde superius dictum est et plenius.
"When any person therefore has made such a loan, if he gets back
more than this loan, and if he dies while this accusation is pending, he
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will be condemned by the le: terr&e as a usurer, on which subject we
have spoken above, more fully."
22. Lib. xiv, 2 [W. pp. 176 and 177] Placitum de occultatione
inventi thesauri fraudulosaubi certus apparetaccusator modo et ordine
pr&edicto solet tractari. Ob infamiam autem non solet aliquis iu.t-ta
legem terre per legem apparentem se purgare, licet aliter per assisam
fieri posset, nisi prius convictus fuerit vet confessus in curria aliquod
genus metalli in loco proposito invenisse et recepisse. Si enim super hoc
convictus fuerit, prasumptionecontra eum faciente, tenebiturse inurgare
per legem terr&e se nihil amplius ibi invenisse vel recepisse.
"The plea concerning the fraudulent concealment of treasure-trove,
when a specific accuser appears, is generally conducted in the manner
and order stated above. On mere rumor it is not usual for anyone to
clear himself by waging law in accordance with the lex terra . . .
although on the other hand, he may do so by the assize-unless he was
first attainted or unless he has confessed that he has discovered and
taken some kind of precious metal in the place in question. If he is
attainted on this point, and the general appearance is against him, he
will be required to clear himself by the lex terre that he neither found
nor took anything more there."
If we examine the instances numbered 1-8, containing ius regni alone,
it will be seen that, besides the general references 1-3, the reference in 4 is
to a general rule of feudal tenure, 5 to primogeniture, 6 to the incapacity of
bastards, 7-8 to escheats. The long phrase ius et consuetudo regni, refers
in 9 to trial by battle, IO to warranty of tenure, i i to the right of a lord over
his serfs, 12 to the procedure in the royal court, 13 to freedom of bequeathing chattels, 14 to the feudal right of maritagium, 15 to homage and its
effect on dower, 16 to the incapacity of bastards.
That is to say, in all these cases, we are dealing with a feudal system
fully organized and involving an interrelation of persons of varying status
from the nativus to the sovereign; in this case, the king. The ius regni, or
the ius et consuetudo regni, refers to specific elements in a regnum, as understood by feudal lawyers, that is, the complex of claims and privileges which
bound together all the subjects of a rex to him and to each other through
direct or indirect grant from him.
Now if we examine numbers 17-22, even if we put out of our minds

as completely as we can the interminable controversy concerning lex terre
in Magna Carta, we shall see that we are in a different sphere. The term
cannot be translated "law of the land" without being unintelligible, and its
exact equivalent is sufficiently dubious to make it necessary to leave it
untranslated for the present. In 17 and 18, the phrase is "to lose one's lex
terrae", which in 17, Glanvill considerately explains for us. The man who
has lost lex terre is incompetent as a witness or as a champion in trial by
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battle. The witness, of course, is a compurgator, not the modern witness,
but it is well to note that suffering either incapacity is to lose lex terra. In
20, an outlaw, utlagatus,has his status determined by the lesr terra. In 22,
once more the reference is apparently to compurgation.
In number 19, the phrase "aliqua lex terrce" is added to ordinary proof,
dirationatio, "deraigning", and can mean nothing but the capacity to make
proof in some other way than the usual form of compurgation. In 21,
however, there is a specific reference to the condemnation of usurers by the
lez terrce. Glanvill refers us to a previous fuller discussion of this point,
which turns out to be lib. vii, c. 16. There it is declared unreservedly that
the usurer forfeits all his goods and chattels to the king, and that this is
established only after the usurer's death by a special inquisitio regia-per
duodecim legales homines de visneto . . . nothing more or less than what

we should describe as a trial by jury, but one that still maintains its original
function of asserting a royal prerogative.
This is in sharp contrast with the lex terrae of the other passage, which
dealt entirely with a personal privilege of a subject and one which once by its
terms utlagatus and in the other cases by its substance, compurgation, is
rooted in an ancient and pre-Norman status. Except for this one disturbing passage, we should be able to take ius regni as the law which owes its
existence in England to a developed feudalism and therefore to the Norman
conqueror. It is the law which the king will enforce either in his courts or
in any other courts as far as he may control them. Against this, it would
be possible to contrast the lex terrce as something which in Glanvill's mind,
had its roots in the soil, a body of immemorial privileges that antedated the
regnum as the Normans understood it.7 The contrast may indeed be made,
but it would require the reservation that lex terrce might be used occasionally
in a sense indistinguishable from what seems to be the implication of ins
regni.
As a matter of fact, however, if we look at 7 and 21 together, it is
evident that the ius regni is specifically associated with the disinheritance of
the usurer's heirs while the lex terrc refers to the condemnation of the dead
usurer and the forfeiture of his chattels. That is not much of a difference,
but it may be well to keep it in mind. What is clear, however, is the fact
that as far as the usurer himself is concerned, his posthumous status is
declared to be established by the lex terrce.
It is therefore not inappropriate to cite a passage from the Laws of
Edward the Confessor, as published in Liebermann, Gesetze der Angelsaclhsen.8
We must therefore qualify somewhat the statement of Professor Plucknett (op. cit.
supra note 4, at 179) that Glanvill completely ignores "all the tangled masses of local custom which certainly were still in force; . . . most of the surviving traces of pre-conquest
law are likewise absent from his book."
8 I LIEBERMANN, GEsaTZE Dm ANGELSAMCSEN (1903)

668a, 37.
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De usurariis. Usurarios etiam defendit rex Eadwardus, ne esset
aliquisin regno suo: et si aliquisinde probatus esset, omnes possessiones
suas perderet et pro ex lege haberetur.
"On Usurers. King Edward likewise forbade usurers, that there
be none of them in his kingdom: and if anyone be proved guilty of it,
he was to lose all his possessions and be held an outlaw."
The Laws of the Confessor is more than suspect. It is likely that the
characterization of it by Maitland as "private work of a bad and untrustworthy kind" 9 must be allowed to stand. That it is a statement of AngloSaxon laws declared by juries summoned for that purpose by William is of
course untenable. Liebermann submitted the book to an exhaustive analysis
in his edition and later in 1916 in the third volume of his great work, he
gave a revised introduction and evaluation of it (pp. 339-342).

One thing,

however, is evident. It is not, like the Mirrour of Justices, an irresponsible
and unscrupulous screed. The author doubtless lied in the interests of his
order and on any controversial point, his evidence is probably not as good
as that of almost any other document of the period, but Dr. Liebermann is
far from rejecting the Leges Edwardi as an historical source. ""Der historische Wert," he tells us 10 "des Schriftchens ist im Verhdltnis zum
Uinfang bedeutend." For a number of matters, found here and here only,
Liebermann accepts the evidence of the collection as authoritative.
It is quite certain that when the book was written, the deceased usurer's
chattels were forfeited in England. But this usage certainly did not come
from Normandy where it was unknown or from any of the fiefs of the
Norman-Angevin line." We need not accept the statement of the Leges
Edwardi that it was the Confessor who established this, but it seems likely
enough that the rule was pre-Norman. In other words, it may well be a
I PoLLOcx & MAITLAND, op. cd. supra note I, at lO3.
GESETZE DER ANGELSACHSEN (1916) 342, 10.
The disposition of a usurer's property is also set forth in the DIALuoGus DE ScAccAwo
(Hughes, Crump, Johnson ed. II, x, b, 136, with the elaborate note at 224-225. A discrepancy is declared by the editors to exist between Glanvill and the Dialogue, but if it does, it is
probably not in regard to the realty, since Glanvill is far from saying that the land escheats
or is forfeited. The difference is in the statement "sive testatus sive intestatus" of Glanvill as
compared with the simple si intestatusof the Dialogue. But the qualification in the Dialogue
really removes the discrepancy. The editors seem to cite 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND (1895)
354 for the case of Hamo Blund "who died intestate and is commonly accused of having lent
his money on usury". CHRON. JOcEINI DE BRAKELOND (Camden Soc. p. 67). There is some
confusion here. The reference to PoLLocK & MAITLAND should be to page 357 (Ist ed. at
355), and the statement occurs neither in PoLLocx & MAITLAND nor in Jocelyn. Hamo was
not charged with usury, but it appeared merely that he had deliberately chosen to die intestate
as to most of his property. Perhaps the editors have confused Hamo Blund with Adam
Blund, who in 31 Henry II accounted to the exchequer for the "chattels of an usuress",
MADOX, HISTORY OF THE EXCHEQUER (1769) x, § 8, p. 237, n. r. There is an English translation of Jocelyn by L. C. Jane (I9O7), in which the Blund incident is told on p. 144.
It will be noted that the entire passage "Heredes . . . hereditas" of Glanvill [W. p. 112,
text supra no. 7] is omitted by Mss. R and V. Both manuscripts belong to the better (beta)
tradition, [W. pp. 19-21] but are not the best of their group. It seems reasonable to assume
that the omission indicates either a change in the law on usurers between Glanvill and the
date of R, or a difference of opinion on what the law was.

103 LIEBERMANN,
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fact that the dead usurer was dealt with in pre-Norman times just as the
Leges Edwardi declare, to wit, as outlaw, eex, utlagatus. And if he was
exlex, utlagatus, the expression per legem terre is technically correct, as is
shown by 22 and by the various passages in Bracton where per legem terre
is closely associated with utlagatio.
This brings 21 within the distinction sought to be established and
makes it possible to assert for Glanvill a conscious and consistent discrimination between ius regni and lex terrce.
This ius regni as well as the fuller form ius et consuetudo regni is contrasted with the canon law on the subject of legitimation and with local
custom on the subject of primogeniture. It is further, in regard to liberty
of testation, declared to be in accord with other systems. It is, therefore, a
system which already has certain characteristic rules, almost certain fixed
principles. It is further a system which allows controversies to arise, so
that its right to challenge a place at the side of the canons and the leges
romance is not too preposterous.
The distinction between lex terre and ius regni here sought to be made
out, may throw a little light on the most famous crux of English constitutional history, the phrase per iudicium parium vel per legem terre of Magna
Carta. Evidently the question cannot be fully discussed here. The dispute
has raged furiously and except for the negative conclusion that iudicium
parium is not trial by jury, no general agreement may be said to have been
reached. The most important divergence on the subject of ley terre is between those who think of it as referring to compurgation and those who
regard it as the practical equivalent of its literal translation, "law of the
land" in the modern sense. 12
Apparently the meaning here suggested for
the phrase in its use in Glanvill has not been discussed. If it is used in
Magna Carta, as it seems to be in Glanvill, it refers not to compurgation
alone, but in general to any rule which could be ascribed to ancient preNorman days-which was attached to the soil itself, either any particular
piece of it or to all of it.
One thing further is to be noted. A patent of May IO, 1215, referring

to the projected agreement between John and the barons, has frequently been
cited in connection with the interpretation of the charter. John declares
that he has granted his hostile barons, that no one will be condemned nisi
per legem regni nostri vel per iudicium pariurnin curia nostra.'3 The exact
' For a discussion of these much disputed words, cf. ADAMS, THE ORIGIN OF THE ENG(Enlarged ed. 1920) 242, and 262-274, n. D; VINOGRADOFF, MAGNA
CARTA COMMEMORATION ESSAYS (H. E. Malden's ed. 1917) clause 39, at 78-95; and
PowicxE, PER IuDIc Im PA~m-Ul vEL PER LErGm TERRAE 96-121; McKEcHNIE, MAGNA
CARTA (1914) 375-395, C. 39. Cf. also, I HOLDSWoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d
ed. 1922) 60-63.
The letter is generally quoted from RYMER'S FOEDERA, i, 128. It is to be found, however, in a more authentic source, the Rotidi Litterarur Patenthon, at page 14I-a reference
I owe to my colleague, Professor W. A. Morris.
LISH CONSTITUTION
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words of the patent occur in the Charter with two significant changes. The
words in curia nostra are omitted and per legem regni nostri is changed to
per legem terre.14
That the omission of the words in curia nostra is a deliberate change
demanded and secured by the barons is unquestionable. They were not
ready to admit that the judgment of their peers by which they might lose
their lives or property must in every case be rendered in the presence and
under the presidency of the king. 15
May we make the same assertion for the change of lex regni to lex
terre? We assume of course that lex regni and ius regni are in this instance practically equivalent. May we assume that the suggestion of lex
regui to the barons was of something which, being coextensive with the
king's allegiance, was justiciable only in the king's courts? In that case, we
can understand that the expression lex terre would carry with it a claim to
immemorial privileges both against the king and against, it may be, their
sub-vassals. It has been asserted 16 that lex terre must be taken in a general
sense, because compurgation or ordeal could take place only after a iudicium.
But in case of outlawry-the almost classic example of a proceeding per
legem terre, there was no iudicium because the defendant did not appear.
Once Magna Carta was established as the most important of English
constitutional documents-and long before it was made into a fetish by
Coke-the phrase per legem terre could be taken to be the practical equivalent of ius regni, and doubtless was so taken. This was especially the case
when the peculiar institutions dealt with by the lex terre, the ordeal, outlawry, compurgation, were either obsolete or obsolescent. By that time,
however, the phrase lex communis had become definitely established.
In conclusion one may call attention to a significant phrase. Glanvill,
iii,
c. 4 [W. p. 72] speaks of the ius et consuetudo curie in the matter
lib.
of essoins. It is, in all strictness, a procedural matter, but we can see how
the "custom of the court" is hard to distinguish from a "custom of the
realm" which is only to be asserted in the king's court. We are far away,
as yet, from any doctrine that the court either declares or makes the law.
Still ius et consuetudo have already indicated a movement in that specific
direction, and the curia domini regis in all its phases will soon assume an
" The letter of Pope Innocent III to the barons (Ryvm's FoEDERA, i, 136) quotes the
grant of John in the terms that John uses in the patent above mentioned and ignores the
changed form in which these expressions actually appear in the Charter.
'As far as the meaning of vel is concerned, there is no doubt that the word is used in
Medieval Latin where "and" is a better translation than "or". Maitland suggested that the
mercantile and/or would be a proper equivalent. I PoL.OCl & MAIrLAND, op. Cit. supra
note I, at 173 n. 3. Professor Adams supposed that a disjunctive use of vel would give the

king a choice between iudicium parium and lexr terrae,assuming that lex terrae meant a kind
of procedure. ADAMs, op. cit. supra note 12, at 263. However, in classical Latin, vel gives
the choice to the person addressed.
10 ADAMS,

op. cit. supra note 12, at 263.
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intuitional relation with the law of the realm to an extent met with nowhere
else.
Of this Glanvill doubtless had no intimation. But of a "Common Law"
in our sense-the law of England as such-he might have given no bad
description, if he said it was the logical development of the ius regni, as
distinguished from the lex terrce.
Since we are dealing only with Glanvill, the later use of lex terre is not
necessarily conclusive. But even in this later usage, it is probable that the
distinction between lex terra and the common law proper, the ius regni, is
maintained. The use of the phrase secundum legem terre in connection
with outlawry, utlagatio, is frequent in Bracton, as commentation on Magna
Carta have indicated. Besides the usual references to ff. 125-132, Professor
Woodbine has been kind enough to call my attention to ff. 31ib, 421, and
435. I am also indebted to him for references to the phrase in Bracton,
serundum legern et consuetudinem Anglie, which is used of legitimacy (f.
416), age (f.

4

22b), and warranty (f. 423).

It is noteworthy that about a

very special English custom, but one established after the conquest, i. e.,
curtesy, the phrase regularly used in Bracton is secundum legem Anglie, not
legem terre.'7 In Bracton's Note Book, the phrases applied to curtesy are
per consuetudinem regni, (case 266), secundum legem et consuetudinem
regni, (291, 487), secundumr consuetudinem regni (319, 917), per legern
Anglie, (413 in margin, 1182). Once and once only, apparently, is the

expression per legem terre used (1686).
In spite of this single exception, it may surely be said that the phrase
lex terre retains its special sense in much later times. In the early Year
Books ley comune is already well-established, and is usually contrasted with
some right under a statute. But lex terra, i. e., ley (lei) de terrealso occurs,
and usually in a highly specialized sense. So in Neville v. Rokele 18 it is
declared that the lei de terre required two summoners. The phrase is used
in exactly the same situation in Ofheyne v. Staplegate.'9 In Theyn v.
Grendale,20 once more in connection with a summons, we read: "Et ceo de
comune dreit et ley de terre", which is repeated by Hengham. 21 Evidently
comune dreit, which is used interchangeably with comune ley, is different
from ley de terre, although it may have already come to include it. It may
be said that the phrase per legem terre interpolated in the Leges Henrici,8, 1.
in the 13 th century, 22 quoted by Adams, 23 is not inconsistent with the meaning here contended for.
17 Cf. BRACTOr,

ff. 437b, 438, 438b.
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